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CHAPTER 20 
Sex Discrimination 
DIANE LUND and REGINA HEALY 
§20.1. Introduction. During the 1971 S~RVEY year, women 
throughout the country attempted to counteract the discrimination 
embodied in the laws of our society. In some situations, particularly 
in those relating to employment, women's efforts were assisted by 
statutory declarations of a woman's right to equality. In other areas 
such as education, where reliance must usually be placed on consti-
tutional arguments, women's claims have met with varying degrees 
of success. With respect to the laws which limit a woman's right to 
exercise control of her own body, the campaign to effect a statutory 
change in New York's abortion laws1 was an isolated triumph for the 
forces of change.2 The advocates of women's rights cannot look back 
upon a year in which law reform was totally successful, but it never-
theless was a year in which some substantial gains were made. 
§20.2. Discrimination in employment: Statutory remedies. The 
woman who encounters employment discrimination has a number of 
legal remedies she may choose to pursue. The most well-known of 
these is established by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 Title 
VII makes it an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such in~ividual's ... sex ... or ... to limit, segregate or 
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§20.1. 1 N.Y. Penal Law §125.05 (McKinney 1967), as amended by Laws of 1970, 
c. 127, now defines a justifiable abortional act to include an abortion performed within 
24 weeks of the commencement of the pregnancy. 
2 In Massachusetts, bills presented tc;> the 1971 legislature to modify the present 
abortion laws were given an unfavorable report by the Joint Committee on the Judiciary 
and died. The General Laws presently provide that anyone who acts in specified ways 
"with intent to procure the miscarriage of a woman" shall be guilty of a crime. G.L., c. 
272, §19. 
§20.2. 1 42 U .S.C. §2000e. 
1
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classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such 
individual's ... sex .... 2 
Title VII applies to employers who are engaged in industries affecting 
commerce and who employ 25 or more persons. The statute does not 
apply to the United States government as an employer, nor to any 
state or political subdivision thereof, nor to any bona fide private 
club.3 The statute, however, does extend to employment agencies that 
serve the above employers4 and to labor organizations whose mem-
bers work for them.5 Title VII is enforced by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, a federal commission consisting of five 
members appointed by the president.6 The commission is intended 
to function as a conciliatory agency/ and the jurisdictional prere-
quisites for commission intervention prescribed by the statute reflect 
the limited and supplementary role which Congress envisioned for 
the commission. The commission defers to state or local antidiscrimi-
nation agencies whenever possible. With regard to any unlawful em-
ployment practice occurring in a state or political subdivision that 
has an agency through which redress may be had, a complaint must 
first be filed with that agency and a 60-day period allowed in order 
to give the state agency time in which to act before the commission 
will step in.8 After the expiration of the 60-day period, or earlier if 
the state proceedings have been terminated, the aggrieved person may 
file a complaint with the commission.9 In any event, the complaint 
must be filed within 210 days following the occurrence of the alleged-
ly unlawful practice or within 30 days after the state proceedings have 
been terminated, whichever occurs first. 10 Once the complaint is 
properly before it, the commission must investigate the complaint; if 
the commission finds reasonable cause to believe that the charge is 
true, it endeavors to eliminate the practice "by informal methods 
of conference, conciliation and persuasion." 11 As a result of the role 
assigned to the commission by Congress, even when a woman satis-
fies the jurisdictional requirements of Title VII and is able to present 
her complaint to the commission, her likelihood of success will de-
pend upon the commission's ability to persuade the employer to 
z Id. §2000-2(a). 
'I d. §2000e(b). 
4 Id. §§2000e(c), 2000e-2(b). 
s I d. §§2000e(d), 2000e-2( c). 
6 Id. §2000e-4(a). 
7 See I d. §2000e-5( a). 
s Id. §2000e-5(c). The statute provides for a 120-day period during the first year after 
the effective date of such state or local law. 
9 I d. §2000e-5(b). 
10 Id. §2000e-5(d). Different time periods apply if there is no state agency through which 
redress must first be sought. 
11 Id. §2000e-5(a). 
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change its practices. The complainant can bring a civil action against 
the employer, but not until 30 days after filing her complaint with the 
commission.12 If her cause of action arises out of Title VII's provi-
sions, she must first pursue the avenue of administrative conciliation. 
Under certain circumstances, Title VII may even permit what 
might otherwise be considered employment discrimination. A statu-
tory exception permits discrimination on the basis of sex in "those 
certain instances where . . . sex . . . is a bona fide occupational 
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that 
particular business or enterprise .... " 13 The commission has con-
strued this exception narrowly to date. 14 Although it has been argued 
that sex becomes a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) 
whenever state law limits a woman's working activities for her own 
physical or mental protection, such protective labor laws15 have 
often been declared invalid in light of Title VII, 16 thereby elimi-
nating the possibility of their being interpreted so as to create a BFOQ. 
A similar BFOQ exception to the prohibition against sex discrimi-
nation in employment exists in the Massachusetts antidiscrimination 
laws,l7 which in some respects offer broader protection than does 
the federal legislation. 18 The agency that administers the state anti-
discrimination laws is the Massachusetts Commission Against Dis-
crimination (MCAD). 19 Its jurisdiction extends to any employer with 
six or more employees.2° MCAD will investigate every complaint it 
receives; if the allegations appear to be true, MCAD will attempt to 
conciliate the parties.21 If conciliation efforts fail, MCAD may hold 
12 Id. §2000e-5(e). 
13 Id. §2000e-2(e). 
14 The commission has concluded that the job of an airline stewardess cannot be 
limited to persons of one sex. 33 Fed. Reg. 3361 (1968). In this decision the commission 
did not accept the argument that an employee's sexual appeal to customers might be 
"reasonably necessary to the normal operation" of an airline. 
15 E.g., G.L., c. 149, §56, which limits a woman's hours of work in manufacturing 
industries to nine hours a day. 
16 E.g., Garneau v. Raytheon Co., 323 F. Supp. 391 (D. Mass. 1971), discussed in 
§20.3 infra. 
17 G.L., c. I SIB, §4. 
18 More employers are subject to the state antidiscrimination statute, and the state 
agency has enforcement powers. 
19 G.L., c. !SIB enumerates the powers of the MCAD in combating discrimination 
in employment, in the issuance of surety bonds, in housing accommodations, and in 
the granting of mortgage loans. G.L., c. !SIC delineates the commission's authority 
with regard to educational practices. An unsuccessful effort was made during the 1971 
legislative session to enlarge the scope of Chapter !SIC to include discrimination 
based on sex. (House Bill 1500.) 
20 G.L., c. !SIB, §I. 
21 Id. §5. Conciliation was utilized by MCAD in resolving complaints involving 
loss of tenure due to a maternity leave, equal pay disputes, and failure to promote 
women as quickly as comparably qualified men. The conciliation agreements in the 
above cases uniformly affirmed women's rights to equal opportunity and treatment. 
In cases involving failure to promote women fairly, MCAD has ordered the payment 
by the employer of back wages to make up the difference between the wages the com-
plainant actually received and the wages she would have received had she received the 
promotion to which she was entitled. 
3
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public hearings. 22 MCAD has the power to issue cease and desist 
orders,23 a power which the federal commission does not have. 
Other remedies for unfair employment practices may be found in 
the federal equal pay act,24 the state equal pay act,25 and various 
state and federal executive orders.26 
§20.3. Discrimination in employment: Women's protective laws; 
Additional subjects. In Garneau v. Raytheon Co., 1 women employ-
ees of Raytheon alleged that male employees were being hired for or 
promoted to upper echelons of the company in preference to equally 
qualified females. The plaintiffs also challenged the Massachusetts 
statute that fixes the maximum hours for female employees,z on the 
ground that the statute was in conflict with the Civil Rights Act of 
19643 and therefore invalid. Raytheon filed motions for summary 
judgment on all claims, alleging procedural defects. The plaintiffs 
moved for summary judgment with respect to their counts challenging 
the maximum hours statute. The federal district court, ruling on the 
motions of both parties, accepted none of Raytheon's contentions, and 
found an irreconciliable conflict between the Massachusetts law and 
the civil rights act.4 The court held that the state law must yield and 
declared that Raytheon's female employees were entitled to the same 
opportunities for overtime pay that were available to male employ-
ees. The court also entered an order enjoining the Massachusetts 
commissioner of labor and industries from taking any steps to enforce 
the limited work hours rule with respect to females covered by the 
civil rights act.5 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. MCAD has not hesitated in· using its cease-and-desist powers. In the case 
of Ms. Mary Ann DeLio, MCAD issued a cease-and-desist order against the Everett 
Liquor Board after the board had refused to renew Ms. DeLio's permit to tend bar. 
Although Ms. DeLio had been employed as a bartender for nine years, the board con-
tended that she was "neither physically nor emotionally capable" of handling the job. 
The order filed by MCAD directed the board to cease denying work permits on the basis 
of sex and to issue a permit to Ms. DeLio. 
2• 29U.S.C. §206(d). 
25 G.L., c.l51B, §4(1). 
26 E.g., Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 424 (Comp. 1968-1970), which provides in 
part that contractors working with the federal government must agree not to discriminate 
against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, color, or sex. A 
discussion of a recent private action to enforce the substance of Exec. Order No. 11,246 
may be found in §9.3 supra. 
§20.3. 1 323 F. Supp. 391 (D. Mass.l971). 
2 G.L., c. 149, §56, which provides that "no woman shall be employed or permitted 
to work in any . . . factory . . . or any manufacturing, mercantile or mechanical 
establishment ... more than nine hours in any one day .... " 
3 42 U.S.C. §2000e. 
4 Id. §2000e-2(a) provides in part: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for 
an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... 
sex . . . or . . . to limit . . . or classify his employees in any way which would de-
prive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities ... because of 
such individual's ... sex .... " 
5 The court further ruled, with respect to the first count of the complaint, that the 
4
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The question of the impact of Title VII upon the protective labor 
laws of the various states has been raised in a number of other federal 
court proceedings.6 Protective laws were initially enacted, together 
with the child labor laws, in order to safeguard working women and 
children from exploitation. Their constitutionality was upheld in 
Muller v. Oregon1 as a justifiable means of protecting persons of 
lesser capabilities.8 Some protective labor laws sought to provide 
protection for women by requiring special working conditions, such 
as seats on which to rest,9 but most such statutes sought to provide 
protection by prohibiting certain kinds of work for women, 10 im-
posing limits on the weight of objects to be lifted by women, u pro-
hibiting night work by women, 12 and by limiting the number of 
weekly working hours for women.l 3 
Whatever may have been the original merits of the protective labor 
laws, at the present time their operation often denies employment 
opportunities to women.l4 The protection that the laws purport to 
provide becomes less necessary as women become more independent 
and self-sufficient. In many instances, union contracts and other forms 
of government regulation1s are adequate to meet whatever need 
remains. The practical reasons that can be advanced in support of 
retaining the protective labor laws are not compelling ones, and con-
siderable merit attaches to the arguments that these statutes tend to 
keep women out of higher-paying jobs in industry because these jobs 
often involve night work, overtime, or the handling of heavy objects. 
action could be maintained as a class action. The court stated that the class was not 
limited to women who had actually applied for a promotion or transfer at Raytheon, 
since the apparent futility of the application undoubtedly had discouraged women from 
taking either of these steps. Furthermore, because the Equal Employment Opportuni-
ty Commission had then just recently ruled that Title VII was in conflict with and did 
supersede state protective labor laws, the court refused to define the class as all women 
employed by Raytheon after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court 
concluded that the proper class was composed of those women who had been working 
for Raytheon during the 90-day period immediately preceding the filing of the com-
plaint. Civil No. 70-353C (D. Mass., Sept. 30, 1971). 
6 E.g., Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971); 
Local 246, Uti!. Workers v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 320 F. Supp. 1262 (C.D. Cal. 
1970); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Grabiec, 317 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Ill. 1970); Richards 
v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969); Rosenfeld v. Southern 
Pacific Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968). 
7 208 u.s. 412 (1908). 
8 "The two sexes differ in . . . the self-reliance which enables one to assert full 
rights, and in the capacity to maintain the struggle for subsistence." Id. at 422. 
9 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §80-2-13 (1963). 
10 Utah Code Ann. §34-4-1 (1953) (mining), repealed by Laws of 1969, c. 85, §173. 
The present provision is contained in §34-22-2. 
11 G.L.,c.l49,§53A(40pounds). 
12 G.L., c. 149, §59 (prohibiting female employment in a manufacturing establish-
ment before 6 A.M. or after midnight, with certain exceptions). 
13 G.L., c. 149, §56 (nine hours per day). 
14 The situation disclosed in Garneau is a case in point. The women employees 
of Raytheon were legally prohibited from putting in overtime due to G.L., c. 149, §56. 
15 FairLaborStandardsActof 1938,29 U.S.C. §§201-217. 
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To the practical considerations must be added the question of the 
constitutional validity of laws that interfere with an adult woman's 
right to compete for and to hold jobs on an equal footing with men. 
Equal protection standards16 that must be met when a state seeks to 
interfere with fundamental rights are stringent; there must be a com-
pelling state interest to justify such an interference. 17 The right to 
work is basic. 18 If state protective labor laws were challenged, it is 
unlikely that sufficient justification for the laws could be offered. The 
judiciary has been understandably reluctant to deal with protective 
laws in constitutional terms, in view of the degree of administrative 
supervision needed to implement such a decision effectively. 19 
The Garneau court answered only the question of whether an em-
ployer subject to Title VII can, under appropriate circumstances, use 
the Massachusetts protective labor laws ~o justify the denial of em-
ployment opportunities to women. The court, by answering in the 
negative, concurred with two opinions rendered by Attorney General 
Quinn at the request of MCAD.2° The court's holding is also con-
sistent with the current position of the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission. 21 In spite of the Garneau decision, however, 
the protective labor laws of the Commonwealth are in force for some 
employers22 and not for others, a situation sufficiently confused to 
open the way to selective compliance with the laws. The confusion is 
liable to be compounded because the statute defining the scope of 
MCAD's jurisdiction specifically excepts the protective labor laws. 23 
The exception was inserted in the law at a time when it was assumed 
that the protective labor laws were valid, and it is therefore possible 
that the exception is subject to reinterpretation in light of the recent 
developments in the area of employment discrimination. While the 
exception to MCAD's jurisdiction still exists, however, MCAD may 
be reluctant to attack an employer's now invalid adherence to the 
protective labor laws. 
Attempts to obtain repeal of the women's protection laws met with 
little success during the 1971 SuRVEY year. All bills concerning the 
16 U.S. Canst. amend. XIV. 
17 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
18 "The instant case compels the application of the strict scrutiny standard of 
review ... because the statute limits the fundamental right of one class of persons 
to pursue a lawful profession .... " Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d I, 17, 485 P.2d 
529, 539, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 339 (1971 ). 
19 See Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Commn., 284 F. Supp. 956, 960 (C. D. Cal. 
1968), in which the court noted that a challenge to the state's protective laws involved 
important questions "from the standpoint of the orderly administration of the law of 
the state .... " 
20 Mass. Op. Atty. Gen. (Mar. 5, 1971 ); Mass. Op. Atty. Gen. (Sept. 30, 1970). 
21 The commission, after some vacillation, now takes the position that all state 
protective laws that are prohibitory conflict with Title VII. 29 C.F.R. §1604.l(b) (1971). 
22 The two major categories of Massachusetts employers not subject to Title VII 
are governmental bodies (the state and all political subdivisions) and employers having 
fewer than 25 employees. 42 U.S.C. §2000e(b). 
23 G.L., c. 151 B, §9. 
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operation and effect of the protective laws were referred to a special 
study commission, the purpose of which was 
to study laws limiting and regulating the employment of females 
in the commonwealth, determine the effect of such laws on the 
health, safety and welfare of the commonwealth and evaluate 
the implications of Title VII of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964 
as well as other federal laws and the Constitution of the United 
States on such laws.24 
The study commission is made up of legislators and representatives 
from labor, industry, women's rights groups, and the general public. 
Within the next year, the commission is expected to introduce new 
legislation designed to update the existing protective labor laws. 
There are a number of avenues open to the legislative study com-
mission; the commission could recommend: (l) maintenance of the 
status quo; (2) extension of the protective labor laws to both men and 
women; (3) repeal or modification of those protective laws that are 
without valid basis and retention of those that are justifiable; or (4) 
repeal of all protective labor laws without distinction. The first alter-
native, maintenance of the status quo, is unacceptable because it would 
be unfair. The constitutionality of many of the laws is suspect, and 
many others seem clearly invalid. As long as the legislature refrains 
from clarifying the state laws, there will be room for unscrupulous 
or uninformed employers to take advantage of women employees 
without running the risk of prosecution, because of the uncertainty 
of the situation. The legislature has a duty to refashion the laws to 
remove confusion and facilitate enforcement. The second alternative, 
extension of the protective laws to men, is clearly unrealistic. The 
third, selective retention of the protective laws, is perhaps the most 
defensible on a rational basis; if the protective labor laws are based 
on any valid distinctions that ought to be enshriq.ed in law, then the 
laws embodying such distinctions perhaps ought to be retained. Al-
though selective retention would perhaps be the most rational choice, 
it would arguably make the protective laws much more complex and 
perhaps more difficult to enforce. It will also take a great deal of time 
to survey the Commonwealth's economy, job by job, to determine 
those jobs that women ought not to be permitted to hold and the con-
ditions under which other jobs must be held. Until such time as a job-
by-job analysis is conducted, it is submitted that the wholesale repeal 
of the protective labor laws is called for. Most of such laws have be-
come suspect under the language of the civil rights act and presently 
perform no function other than unjustifiably keeping women from 
competing equally with men. 
Additional subjects. Preliminary steps have been taken to remedy 
discriminatory employment practices in state government. On July 
20, 1970, Governor Sargent issued a Code of Fair Practices,25 which 
24 Reso1vesof 1971, c. 23. 
25 Exec. Order No. 74 (Ju1y20,1970). 
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calls for affirmative action on the part of state agencies to ensure non-
discrimination and equal employment opportunities for women with-
in state government. Most parts of the code include sex as a discrimina-
tory classification. The code requires each appointing authority 
within the executive branch to appoint an equal employment oppor-
tunity officer and requires each authority to file an annual report 
with MCAD describing the programs initiated during the year in 
implementation of the code. It also requires that every state contract 
contain a nondiscrimination clause and that contracts for more than 
$100,000 contain an affirmative action provision. State employment 
services, educational counseling and training programs, and private 
health and educational facilities that are licensed or chartered by the 
state are required to function on a nondiscriminatory basis as a con-
dition of continued participation in any state program and of eligi-
bility for state assistance. The provisions of the code dealing with 
state licensing agencies, the duties of their licensees, and housing 
accommodations do not include sex as a discriminatory classification. 
Broad enforcement and implementation powers are given by the code 
to MCAD. 
Chapter 221 of the Acts of 1971 amended the civil service law26 to 
provide that examinations to establish eligibility lists for civil service 
appointments or promotions must be open to persons without respect 
to sex unless a restriction on the basis of sex has the prior approval of 
MCAD. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 221, civil service examina-
tions and appointments could be restricted to persons of one sex with-
out the approval of MCAD. 27 Chapter 221 will open previously 
single-sex civil service appointments to both men and women where 
the single-sex requirement had no rational basis. 
§20.4. Discrimination in public accommodations. Chapter 418 
of the Acts of 1971 enlarged the scope of the statutory prohibition 
against discrimination by places of public accommodation, resort, 
or amusement by forbidding discrimination on the basis of sex. 1 The 
effect of Chapter 418 has been outlined in part by the attorney general: 
"[Chapter 418] impliedly repealed those provisions in ch. 112, §§87F 
and 87T which limit a barber from offering the same services to fe-
males which he performs for males and which limit a hairdresser 
26 G.L., c. 31, §2A. 
27 G.L., c. 31, §2A, prior to being amended by Chapter 221, provided that examina-
tions to establish a list from which civil service appointments could be made could be 
restricted to either male or female applicants at the discretion of the director of civil 
service and with the approval of state or local officials. Examinations to establish 
a list of persons eligible for promotion were not to be restricted to members of one 
sex unless "the duties and responsibilities of a position require special physical or 
medical standards or require custody or care of a person of a particular sex. . . . " 
Id. §2A(e). Chapter 221 subjects the director's discretion to the approval of MCAD. 
§20.4. 1 Acts of 1971, c. 418, §§I, 2, amending G.L., c. 272, §§92A, 98, respectively, 
to add sex to the list of prohibited discriminatory categories. The legislation may reflect 
constitutional requirements. See Seidenberg v. McSorley's Old Ale House, Inc., 308 F. 
Supp. 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
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from offering to make the same services which are afforded females 
[available for males]"2 No public objections to Chapter 418 appear 
to have been advanced by hairdressers, barbers, or their patrons. Chap-
ter 418 also immediately affected men-only taverns, the owners of 
which sought exemption from the statute. In response to the saloon 
owners' supplication, the legislature enacted Chapter 910 of the Acts 
of 1971, which exempted taverns from the application of Chapter 418 
until January 1, 1!)73.3 
The highly visible effects of Chapter 418 notwithstanding, it may 
be that the long-term value of the new statute lies in. its impact on 
banking and credit institutions. It is now settled that such institu-
tions are places of public accommodation within the meaning of the 
General Laws.4 If these financial institutions discriminate against 
women in extending credit (a charge often made by women's groups), 
a remedy is now available. It is supplemented by the change made in 
the Massachusetts antidiscrimination laws by Chapter 874 of the Acts 
of 1971, adding sex as a protected category to the sections prohibiting 
discrimination in the granting of mortgage loans.5 These two laws 
should enable women to obtain financial services on an equal basis 
with men. 
§20.5. Individual rights: Retention of maiden name. Increasing 
numbers of unmarried women are seeking legal assurance of their 
right to retain their maiden names should they become married, and 
many married women are petitioning to resume their maiden names. 
Under the common law, persons were permitted to assume any name 
they chose as long as the adoption of that name was for an honest 
purpose; contracts entered into and transactions conducted under 
the adopted name were valid and binding, and common law did not 
require that one's surname be transferred from generation to genera-
tion.1 A statutory freedom of choice with respect to one's name exists 
in Massachusetts. By G.L., c. 210, §12, the Commonwealth authorizes 
the submission of a change-of-name petition so that an official record 
may be created to definitely and specifically establish a change of 
name.2 In the case of In re Regina A. H. Sloane, 3 the petitioner, a 
married mother of three children, sought to have her maiden name, 
Regina A. Healy, established on an official record as the name by 
which she would be known. Her reason for seeking the change in 
name was to acquire an outward sign of her individual identity, a 
2 Mass. Op. Atty. Gen. (Sept. 23, 1971). 
3 Chapter 910 provides that until January I, 1973, a tavern (as defined in G.L., c. 138, 
§I) "shall not be deemed a place of public accommodation, resort or amusement within 
the meaning of (G. L., c. 272, §92A, as amended by Acts of 1971, c. 418, §!]." 
4 Local Fin. Co. v. MCAD, 355 Mass. 10, 256N.E.2d566(1968). 
5 AmendingG.L., c. !SIB, §4. 
§20.5. 1 See Mark v. Kahn, 333 Mass. 517, 131 N.E.2d 758 (1956), and cases cited 
therein. 
2 See Petition of Buyarsky, 322 Mass. 335, 77 N.E.2d 216 (1948). 
3 No. 445705 (Middlesex P. Ct., Feb. 8, 1971). 
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sign that would be unique to her. The court inquired as to whether 
Ms. Sloane's husband objected to her request. He did not, and her 
petition was granted. 
Ms. Sloane's request was unusual. The name-change procedure is 
normally utilized by a woman to reacquire her maiden name following 
a divorce; Ms. Sloane, however, had not been divorced nor was she 
contemplating divorce. Although a member of an ongoing family 
group, she wanted a last name different from that of the other members 
of the group. As illustrated by Sloane, the court's request for the hus-
band's assent to the wife's name change has become a standard feature 
of such proceedings. It is submitted that no interest of the state can be 
identified in the procedural requirement that a husband assent to the 
wife's change of name. It is not a valid exercise of judicial discretion 
to require a woman to bear a name that she does not want, unless there 
is a demonstrable administrative reason therefor. At present, a 
woman's child may bear a surname different from his mother's after 
the mother has undergone a divorce and remarriage; and no detri-
mental administrative consequences appear to result if the parties to 
a marriage choose to have different surnames. On the other hand, a 
growing number of women now believe it to be in their personal 
interest to express their individuality by the resumption or retention 
of their maiden names. A woman ought to be free to use her maiden 
name as a matter of right, subject only to her satisfying whatever pro-
cedural requirements are deemed necessary for administrative reasons. 
Enabling legislation is needed and should be enacted to this end. 
§20.6. Discrimination in public education. The right of an un-
married pregnant student to continue to attend high school classes 
was recognized in Massachusetts during the 1971 SuRVEY year in 
Ordway v. Hargraves. 1 Ms. Ordway had been excluded from attending 
cla~~ses by a school rule providing that as soon as an unmarried student 
was known to be pregnant, her "membership" at the school was to be 
terminated. Although the plaintiff had been denied entrance to 
school, the school officials had made special provisions to give her 
home tutoring and had offered to allow her to attend school functions, 
to participate in senior class activities, and to graduate with her class. 
In her action under the federal civil rights act2 against the high school 
principal, the members of the regional high school committee, and 
the members of the school committees of the participating towns, Ms. 
Ordway alleged that her exclusion from school had deprived her of a 
constitutionally protected right. She sought an order readmitting her 
to classes and a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the 
school rule. 
At the federal district court hearing on the plaintiff's application, 
there was testimony that regular attendance at school would not be 
physically detrimental to the plaintiff, that the enforced absence of 
§20.6. 1 323 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Mass. 1971). Ordway is further discussed in §16.9 
supra. 
2 42 u.s.c. §1983. 
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the plaintiff from school could in fact be psychologically harmful to 
both the plaintiff and her unborn child, and that the plaintiff was not 
having any difficulty in her social relationships with other students. 
There was also testimony that the substitute instruction offered by 
the school in lieu of class attendance was inferior to the regular pro-
gram. The defendants were unable to identify an educational pur-
pose that would be served by the plaintiff's exclusion from classes, and 
conceded that the plaintiff's pregnant condition had not occasioned 
any disruptive incidents or otherwise interfered with school activities. 
In his testimony, the principal implied that the school rule reflected a 
desire on the part of the school committee to refrain from appearing 
to condone premarital sexual relations. 
The court acknowledged that the right to receive a public school 
education was "a basic personal right of liberty," and stated that the 
burden of justifying a school regulation that limited such a right was 
on the school authorities. Absent a showing of danger to the health 
of the plaintiff, disruption of school activities or threat of harm to 
others, or any other valid reason for excluding the plaintiff, the federal 
District Court for Massachusetts held that the school authorities had 
failed to carry their burden of proof. 
The implication can be drawn from the court's decision in Ordway 
that the exclusion of a pregnant unmarried student from public school 
in order to discourage premarital sexual activity is unconstitutional. 
Although admittedly the court was not presented with a direct chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of such an exclusion, it is submitted 
that the denial of a normal high school education to an unmarried 
pregnant student, solely on moral grounds, is constitutionally sus-
pect. Had the school committee relied solely on its power to control 
the moral behavior of high school students, the question as to. the 
authority of the committee to do so would have been squarely pre-
sented. The much broader question, however, involves the constitu-
tionality of the practice of imposing penalties only on women as a 
means of deterring a course of action or behavior that necessarily 
involves both men and women.3 The latter question, although per-
haps the more important one, would have been difficult to reach on 
the facts of the instant case. 
In Bray v. Lee,4 the plaintiffs were female students who had been 
denied admission to Girls Latin High School in Boston. Girls Latin 
and Boston High School are perhaps the two most academically 
advanced of Boston's high schools, the former being open only to 
girls, the latter only to boys. The plaintiffs filed a class action chal-
lenging the admission practices of both high schools, specifically the 
fact that boys were accepted to Boston Latin on the basis of entrance 
examination scores lower than those achieved on the same examina-
tion by girls who were denied admission to Girls Latin. One cause 
of the discrepancy in admission standards was the difference in 
s See, e.g., G.L., c. 276, §10 (common nightwalkers). 
4 Civil No. 70·2002-C(D. Mass.June23,1971). 
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capacity between the two schools: Boston Latin could accommodate 
3000 students, but Girls Latin could accommodate only 1500. The 
initial decision in the case, rendered by a federal magistrate, denied 
the defendants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment; the 
magistrate found that the plaintiffs had been discriminated against 
by reason of the unequal physical facilities available to them. The 
magistrate's opinion strongly suggests that an equal educational 
opportunity for both sexes would exist if they were provided with 
separate but equal schools.5 
The single-sex school, public or private, is a common institution 
in New England and is accepted by parents and students of both 
sexes. There have been several propositions put forward through the 
years in support of continuing single-sex educational institutions, 
i.e., that education is more easily imparted in single-sex schools 
because of the lack of distracting influences present when adolescents 
and pre-adolescents of different sexes are present in the same school; 
that girls receive the opportunity in a single-sex school to learn 
leadership, an opportunity that would be denied to them if boys 
were present; that single-sex schools are necessary to prevent the 
discouragement of boys who, in coeducational classes, would not be 
able to perform as well as girls; and, finally, that the academic suc-
cesses of girls in coeducational classes would cause teachers to divert 
the majority of their efforts and time to girls, to the detriment of the 
education of boys. One would be hard-pressed today, however, to 
defend such propositions on accepted sociological or educational 
grounds. Nonetheless, it is a large step from saying "the reasons 
advanced for single-sex public schools are not educationally or 
sociologically valid" to saying "single-sex public schools are per se 
constitutionally invalid. "6 A constitutional attack on single-sex 
public schools will require proof that the education received from 
such institutions differs from that received in an integrated environ-
5 The decisions cited by the magistrate were all handed down prior to Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). One may well question whether the separate 
but equal concept is invalid when applied to blacks seeking integrated schools, but 
valid when applied to women seeking integrated schools. 
6 The constitutionality of public, single-sex educational facilities has been con-
sidered by two lower federal courts in the cases of Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 
(D.S.C. 1970), and Kirstein v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 309 F. Supp. 184 
(E.D. Va. 1970). In Williams, the male plaintiffs sought to enjoin the operation of cer-
tain South Carolina statutes that limited admission at Winthrop College to females. 
The plaintiffs did not allege any special feature of Winthrop which would have made 
it more educationally advantageous for them, nor did they point to any courses in 
which they wished to enroll that were offered only at Winthrop. They thus failed to 
establish that they were injured by being denied admission to Winthrop. The court 
stated that under the circumstances it could not find "as a matter of law that a legisla-
tive classification, premised as it is on respectable pedagogical opinion, is without any 
rational justification and violative of the Equal Protection Clause." 316 F. Supp. 134, 
138. The existence of the "respectable pedagogical opinion" was stipulated by plain-
tiffs, who conceded that "a respectable body of educators ... believe that 'a single-sex 
institution can advance the quality and effectiveness of its instruction by concentrating 
upon areas of primary interest to only one sex.' "Id. at 137. The apparent lack of effort 
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ment and that the difference is disadvantageous to the sex-segragated 
pupils. Absent a scholarly consensus as to the sociological or educa-
tional validity of such a conclusion/ a decision declaring the per se 
unconstitutionality of single-sex public schools is not likely to be 
forthcoming. 
In the Commonwealth, fortunately, the single-sex public school 
may become an institution of the past. By Chapter 622 of the Acts of 
1971, the legislature amended the General Laws to provide that a 
public school may not discriminate on the basis of sex in its admis-
sions policies, and that students may not be discriminated against on 
the basis of sex with respect to privileges, advantages, and courses of 
study.8 Chapter 622 also amended the General Laws in such a way 
as to provide that the parent or guardian of a child who is unlawfully 
excluded from a public school, or from an educational program of a 
public school because of the child's sex, may bring an action in tort 
for the child against the city, town, or school district whose officials 
are responsible for the exclusion.9 
Part of the support for Chapter 622 was based on the expectation 
that the amendment would change those policies of the Boston schools 
that were challenged in Bray. Such a change would significantly en-
large the academic opportunities available for female students 
attending Boston's schools. Prior to the passage of Chapter 622, of 
the four Boston high schools graduating the highest percentages of 
college-bound students, only Girls Latin admitted girls. 10 The 
number of places available only to boys gave males a much greater 
chance of obtaining a high school education that would prepare them 
for continuing their schooling at the college level. Chapter 622 affords 
girls an equal opportunity to receive high-quality preparatory edu-
cation and should produce a long-overdue reordering in the field 
of occupational education. In many Massachusetts public schools, 
on the part of the plaintiffs to develop any factual justification for their lawsuit, coupled 
with their seeming eagerness to stipulate arguable points, severely weakens the prece-
dential value of the case. 
In Kirstein, four female plaintiffs sued to be admitted to the University of Virginia at 
Charlottesville. The federal court concluded that the Charlottesville campus offered 
educational opportunities "not afforded in other institutions operated by the state" and 
that the defendants could not deny those opportunities to women on the basis of sex. 
It explicitly declined to rule on whether "separate but equal" facilities would be per-
missible. Cf. Allred v. Heaton, 336 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960), cert. denied, 364 
U.S. 517 (1960); Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), cert. denied, 
359 U.S. 230 (1959) (women refused admission to a Texas all-male college.) 
The issue of single-sex public schools is also presented in an emerging line of cases 
involving plans for the racial desegregation of public school systems, which plans in-
clude segregation of the students on the basis of sex. Such plans have been approved by 
federal courts in Smith v. St. Tammany Parish School Bd., 302 F. Supp. 106 (D. La. 
1969), and in Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Bd., 304 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. La. 1969). 
7 But see Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), discussed in n.6 supra. 
8 Acts of 1971, c. 622, amending G.L., c. 76, §5. 
9 Acts ofl971, c. 622, amendingG.L., c. 76, §§5, 16. 
10 Boston Public Schools, Statistics of the 1968 Graduating Class (available in the 
vocational guidance offices of the various Boston public schools). 
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some or all of the vocational and trade courses are limited, either by 
rule or practice, to students of one sex; and in some communities, 
single-sex vocational or trade high schools exist. 11 In addition, the 
counseling provided to students concerning careers and job oppor-
tunities often is based upon sexual stereotypes, effectively restricting 
the choices which both male and female students might consider. 
Chapter 622, if effectively utilized by students and ' their parents, 
should change many of these aspects of occupational education in 
the Commonwealth. 
§20.7. Conclusion. The status of women cannot be improved 
without changing those laws which require, sanction, or encourage 
discrimination on the basis of sex. It is a truism that attitudes can-
not be legislated, but it is equally true that changes in the law are 
often a first step in rearranging the social order and indeed may be 
a prerequisite to an orderly and reasoned evolution of social attitudes. 
The passage and ratification of an equal rights amendment to the 
United States Constitution, the expansion (through litigation) of 
the scope of the guarantees extended to women by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the revision or repeal of discriminatory and reaction-
ary state legislation are all potential means for achieving orderly 
change. Laws that confer a different status upon women or that 
embody concepts about the proper role of women and that fail to 
reflect today's realities and serve to perpetuate stereotypes must 
be eliminated if women are to achieve genuine equality. 
11 An excellent comparative study of occupational educational opportunities for 
boys and girls attending the Boston public schools is Bryan, Discrimination on the 
Basis of Sex in Occupational Education in the Boston Public Schools (unpublished 
report of the Boston Commission to Improve the Status of Women, 1972). Ms. Bryan 
reports that in 1970, Boston's Trade High School, to which only boys were admitted, 
provided training in 12 skills at an average per-pupil expenditure of $1305. Boston 
Trade High School for Girls provided training in 4 skills (clothing trades, food trades, 
cosmetology, and commercial art) at an average per-pupil expenditure of $924. 
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